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AMICUS CURIAE -

MINISTER OF JUSTICE

EDMUND RUFFIN BECKWITH & RUDOLF SOBERNHEIMt

"It is fir the honour of the Court to avoid error in their judgments.
...The Court ex officio ought to examine . ..into errors, though
not moved. Barbarism will be introduced, if it be not admitted to
inform the court of such gross and apparent errors in offices." 1
300 years ago, of a broad concept of
THIS declaration, made nearly
justice then very ancient,2 is more important today than it ever
was and more so in the United States than anywhere else. It is not
only "for the honour of the court" that right judgment shall be rendered.
It is also vitally necessary that the citizen of a free country shall have
the law correctly decided not only in his own immediate interest but
also to continue its rational development as a safeguard against judicial
arbitrariness and for the preservation of free government.'
This applies equally to the law developed in the traditional courts and to the
law as it is developed in proceedings before administrative agencies.
An efficient means to improve the likelihood of correct decision is
the intervention of amicus curiae to assist the court so that it may the
more certainly "avoid error in judgment."4 This essay is concerned
with the manner of his intervention, and the limitations presently applied thereto by the courts. It is concerned with the effect of such
intervention upon the administration of justice as it presently occurs
and with what it might be under a systematic extension of the powers
of amicus.
The hackneyed saying, usually attributed to a former chief justice
of the Supreme Court, that "the law is what the judges say it is,", cont Members of the New York Bar.
1. Protector v. Geering, Hardres 85, 86, 145 Eng. Rep. 394 (1656).
2. To decide the point involved in Protector v. Geering, slipra note 1, the court relied
on a Year Book case, 7 EDw. IV (1449). For other early cases see notes 10, 66 and 71
infra.
3. COLLINOWOOD, THE NEw LEVIATHAx c. XXXIX, XLI (1942); McIvER, THE WEn
OF GOVERNMENT 74 (1947) passim; MERAm, SYSTEFmATIC PoLrTics 123 et seq., 127 (1945).

4. See note I supra. For more recent American pronouncements see Garland Co. v.
Filmer, 1 F. Supp. 8 (N. D. Cal. 1932); In re Perry, 83 Ind. App. 456, 148 N. E. 163
(1925); In re Roff's Estate, 226 Mo. App. 1203, 50 S.W. 2d 156 (1932).
5. See ADDRESSES AND PAPERS OF CHARLES EvANS Huons 139 (1908). The remark made
by (then) Governor Hughes was limited to
a different meaning from the one commonly
ence Monitor, March 20, 1937, p. 16, col.
SEL 97 (1925): "What is the law, anyhow?
he's reversed."

the Constitution and in its context conveyed
ascribed. See editorial in The Christian Sci2. See also TRAIN, By ADvi.c or CottNIt's what some judge says is the law-until
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tains when taken out of its context no more than a half truth. It is much
nearer the fact to say that judicial decision operates on the content, form
and persuasiveness of the data submitted to the judge, and that the law
is the end-product of the submission as well as of the decision.' This
involves the historic justification of the advocate in the judicial process
and for the present purpose it involves particularly the function of
amicus.
Everyone knows that the decision in any case may prove to be
erroneous either because of the limited skill or knowledge of the tribunal
or because of the inadequacy or personal interest of either or both of
the contending parties or attorneys. The effort to forestall error resulting from such causes has taken many forms, such as the so-called
"Brandeis brief" 7 which produces relevant facts dehors the record, or
perhaps also the recent notion that administrative agencies may safely
be permitted to "expertise" with only limited judicial review. The
evolution of an ideal rationale of judicial decision may be greatly assisted by the systematic intervention of skilled and well-informed friends
of the public interest on a much larger scale than heretofore realized,
in spite of the fact that in many cases the intervenor acting as amicus
may have some eventual axe to grind, self-interest being often the best
assurance of skill and diligence.
What problems this may raise in the traditional management of litigation will be considered below, after a discussion of the present state
of the law. It suffices here to indicate that the principal difficulty grows
out of the need to determine the extent to which the parties shall "control the suit" when amicus takes a position different from any of theirS.
The rules governing amicus vary among the several jurisdictions. To
the extent that this may have any importance, an effort will be made
below to show how a greater uniformity may be reasonably obtained.
But first it is desirable to examine the procedural matters upon which
agreement is more or less general.
I.

How

TO

BECOME Amcus

In modem American practice an amicus may be invited by the court
to advise it, or he may volunteer. The former method was the one best
6. Llewellyn, The Modern Approach to Counseling and Advocacy-Especially in Cornvnerciai Transactions,46 COL. L. REV. 167 (1946).
7. So named after the private brief filed by the late Justice Brandeis as attorney in
Muller v. Oregon, 208 U. S. 412, 419 n. 1 (1908), supplying copious factual data in support of the constitutionality of social legislation under the due process dause of the Federal Constitution. For the relevancy of this approach to the amicus problem see p.
infra.
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known to Roman law, where the judges were accustomed to seek the
assistance of a consiliarius in arriving at the correct solution of difficult
questions of law.' But the contrary practice appears in England, from
the earliest mention of the amicus in the Year Books, when the right
was recognized to volunteer advice which had been unsought and may
have been undesired by the court or the parties.'
It developed early under this English practice that amicus need not
be a lawyer but may be any bystander, ° and it is also probable that
some modern problems respecting the powers of amicus have grown at
least in part out of the fact that the initiative for his acting may be
either the court's or his own. Criteria will be suggested below for the
purpose of distinguishing certain powers which it may be proper to
use in some situations but not in others, depending upon the nature
of the case or the character of amicus.
A. Who May Become Amicus
Modern American law recognizes the rule that any individual or organization is as such entitled to apply for leave to act as amicus," provided other procedural requirements are fulfilled. The favorable attitude of most state courts towards the latter approach is well expressed
in the oft-referred-to statement of the Supreme Court of Michigan in
Grand Rapids v. Consumers' Power Co., 12 that:

"In cases involving questions of important public interest, leave is generally
granted to file a brief as amicus curiae....
8. WENGER, INSTITUTES OF THE ROMAN LAW OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 202 et seq. and
passin (Fisk Transl. rev. ed. 1940).
9. Early cases beginning with the reign of Edward III in the middle of the 14th century are found in SIMON THELOALL, LE DIGEST DES BRIEFES ORIGINALS ET DES CIIOSES CONCERNANTS Eux lib. 13, cap. 14 (London 1579), and in Rolle's and Viner's Abridgements.
The reference to a statute of Henry IV in United States v. Gale, 109 U. S. 65 (1883), and
in 1 BOUVIER'S LA,.v DICTIONARY 188 (Rawle's 3d rev. 1914) as recognizing the right of
amicus curiae, appears to be based on a misunderstanding. Cf. Note, 34 HARV. L. REV.
773 (1921).
10. Y. B. 5 Edw. IV 124, Brev. des Plees, pl. 23 cited in Theloall, op. cit. supra note 9;
Beard v. Travers, 1 Ves. Sr. 313, 27 Eng. Rep. 1052 (1749).
11. Amici appointed by the court are as a rule attorneys. E.g., Whitney v. Randall,
70 Idaho 49, 70 P. 2d 384 (1937); State v. Jefferson Iron Co., 60 Tex. 312 (1883).
But cf. It re Hamilton, 37 F. 2d 758 (C. C. P. A. 1930), denying leave to file brief as
amicus on the ground that applicant is not an attorney of the court and admittedly a
stranger to the proceeding.
12. 216 Mich. 409, 185 N. W. 852 (1921); Myer v. Children's Aid Ass'n, 73 Ind. App.
489, 127 N. E. 835 (1920); Colmes v. Fisher, 151 Misc. 222, 271 N. Y. Supp. 379 (Sup.
Ct. 1934).
13. 216 Mich. 409, 415, 185 N. W. 852, 854 (1921).
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Numerous individuals 4 and interested organizations of the business
and professional world are constantly using the privilege." It is understood, of course, that as amici they must be represented by attorneys
where the local law so requires. Provided that the court's procedural
rules permit the intervention, no other personal qualification is generally
required of amicus.' 0
These principles are not, however, extended with equal freedom to
the representative of the government. When officials having authority in
the matter at hand, usually the attorney general,' 7 offer to intervene, no
other government agencies will be permitted to oppose them in the guise of
amici.' Nor will amicus be appointed to represent the public interest
where a public official has the power br duty to act."0
14. Sometimes this privilege has even been extended to the trial judge defending
his position on the law and arguing for its clarification by the appellate tribunal. People
v. Hopkins, 70 Colo. 163, 197 Pac. 1020 (1921). Contra: In re Pina, 112 Cal. 14, 44
Pac. 332 (1896). And see p. 45 infra and cases cited in note 43 infra.
15. For recent cases in New York see Dry Dock Say. InsL v. 103 E. 75th St. Apts.,
296 N. Y. 280, 72 N. E. 2d 894 (1947); Koussevitzky v. Allen, Towne & Heath, 272 App.
Div. 759, 69 N. Y. S. 2d 432 (1st Dep't 1947); Shielcrawt v. Moffett, 294 N. Y. 180, 61
N. E. 2d 435 (1945). For recent federal examples see Del Guercio v. Delgadillo, 159 F. 2d
130 (C. C. A. 9th 1947), cert. granted, 331 U. S. 801 (1947); Mendez v. Westminster
School Dist., 64 F. Supp. 544 (S. D. Cal. 1946).
16. In one instance at least, leave to become amicus was denied because of excessively
partisan attitude. First Citizens Bank & Trust Co. v. Saranac River Power Corp., 246 App.
Div. 672 (3d Dep't 1935). See also In re Stolen, 193 Wis. 602, 214 N. W. 379 (1927),
rejecting amicus brief of sixty attorneys containing no analysis of facts or law, felt by
the court to be an improper attempt at pressure to obtain clemency in disbarment proceedings against local judge guilty of misconduct. The brief was returned to the petitioners. An attempt to restrict access to the courts by amicus was recently indicated in
the remarks of Hill, J., in Maloney v. Board.of Education, N. Y. Times, Jan. 10, 1948,
p. 30, col. 1 (Sup. Ct. Kings County, N. Y.), requiring the Communist Party of Crown
Heights to deny charges of subversion, before being heard either as amicus or as party.
While in fact the court did not give effect to this statement as a pre-condition to being
heard, such restrictions would be wholly contrary to the spirit of the institution of amicus
and would deprive it of its effectiveness as a protection of the citizenry against proceedings
contrary to law. See II. A. infra and note 1 supra.
17. The Gray Jacket, 5 Wall. 370 (U. S. 1867); United States Supreme Court Rule
27 (9), 8 F. C. A. 214 (Cum. Supp. 1946). For a recent instance, see Flournoy v. Wiener,
321 U. S. 253 (1944). (United States Attorney General submitting amicus brief upholding constitutionality of § 402 (b) (2) of Revenue Act of 1942).
18. But cf. The Gray Jacket, supra note 17, permitting the United States Treasury
Dep't as amicus to defend its position in a prize case against the official government position subsequently adopted by the Attorney General. See Matter of Fay, 291 N. Y. 198,
52 N. E. 2d 97 (1943), permitting a state senator to act as amicus, although the legislative committee of which he was chairman was represented by the state attorney.
19. Sternberg v. Vineland Trust Co., 107 N. J. Eq. 255, 152 At. 370 (Ch. 1930). This
decision seems to overlook the possible need for public-spirited amid to supplement inactive or sluggish public officials.

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 17

Probably, however, authorized officers of the government will always
be admitted as so-called amici, 2 ° even over the objection of one or both
of the parties.21 Their status is based on the view that they perform an
official duty; 22 in some instances this duty has been given the sanction
of statute, custom or administrative rule and its performance no longer
falls within the scope of the true amicus problem.3
B. When Application Must be Made
No narrow procedural rules seem to govern the time when amicus
should apply for leave to act. It has been held that since his being
heard is wholly a matter within the discretion of the court and cannot
be deemed detrimental to the parties, notice need not be given of the
application 24 and that filing is timely if there is an opportunity for the
parties to answer his brief. 25 This practice both on theoretical and on
practical grounds would be preferable to the narrow views expressed
recently in the New York case of Kemp v. Rubin." That case in sub20. United States v. California, 332 U. S. 19 (1947) (National Association of Attorneys General and American Association of Port Authorities); Gardner v. New Jersey,
329 U. S. 565 (1947) (city of Jersey City); United States v. Appalachian Electric Power
Co., 311 U. S. 377 (1940) (forty-one states by their attorneys general) ; Stephens v. First
Nat. Bank of Nevada, 182 P. 2d 146 (Nev. 1947) (United States Attorney as amicus in
lower court). But cf. R. C. Tway Coal Co. v. Glenn, 12 F. Supp. 570 (W. D. Ky. 1935).
21. Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U. S. 245 (1947) (State of California by special leave 6f
court); Fulton v. Schannen, 64 N. E. 2d 798 (Ind. 1946) (public defender).
22. Cf. Sternberg v. Vineland Trust Co., 107 N. J. Eq. 255, 152 Atl. 370 (Ch. 1930).
23. Important examples:
(1) The ,unctions of the United States Attorney General under 50 STAT. 751 (1937), 28
U. S. C. § 401 (1940), authorizing him to intervene for the ptesentation of evidence
and argument in all cases where a party raises the issue of the constitutionality of a
federal statute.
(2) Suggestions of sovereign immunity, formerly presented by the diplomatic representatives of the country concerned as amici curiae (In re Muir, 254 U. S. 522 (1921))
or by way of suggestion (The Pesaro, 255 U. S. 216 (1921)); Compania Espanola
de Navegacion Maritima, S. A. v. The Navemar, 303 U. S. 68 (1938), presented
by the Attorney General or the United States attorneys on behalf of the Departof State. Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U. S. 30 (1945); United States of
Mexico v. Schmuck, 294 N. Y. 265, 62 N. E. 2d 64 (1945). For a suggestion disavowing sovereign immunity, see The Beaton Park, 65 F. Supp. 211 (W. D. Wash.
1946).
(3) The intervention of the appropriate government department before the Board of
Contract Appeals where claims of subcontractors against the prime contractors are
presented under the Renegotiation Act. 56 STAT. 245 (1942), 50 U. S. App. §
1191 (Supp. 1946), as amended, 61 STAT. 133, 50 U. S. C. A. § 1191 (Supp. 1947).
24. Spice Valley School Township v. Rizer, 1 N. E. 2d 289 (Ind. 1936).
25. Stanton v. Ruthbell Coal Co., 34 S. E. 2d 257 (W. Va. 1945).
26. 187 Misc. 707, 64 N. Y. S. 2d 510 (Sup. Ct. 1946).
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stance holds that a motion for leave to appear as amicus made in motion term is premature and will be denied without prejudice to a
renewal before any judge sitting on any actual proceeding in the case,
where an action is awaiting trial and no motion or other proceeding is
actually pending in the court. The reason given that the judge sitting
in motion part "cannot direct any justice to accept this assistance without his consent,"2 disregards the fact that the assistance of amicus is
offered to the court as such and not to the individual judge who may
decide one or another part of the case. Since the granting of leave to
intervene is entirely discretionary with the court and his admission
deemed to be a matter of the administration of justice beyond the reach
of the parties, no error is committed by either granting or denying the
application, and no appeal either by amicus or the parties lies from
such order.28
Where the court takes the initiative to invite amicus to examine and
brief a matter specified by the court, there is no doubt that such assignment will stand against any possible objection.C. How Application is Made
0
Almost all courts require their permission to file a brief as amicusY
2
The application is usually in the form of a motion, with"l or without notice to the parties, setting forth the basis of economic or other social
or political interest on which the applicant acts or his connection with
the pending litigation.
27.

Id. at 709, 64 N. Y. S. 2d at 512.

28. The Claveresk, 264 Fed. 276, 279 (C. C. A. 2d 1920), where the court said: "... it
is assigned for error that the court below permitted its friend to speak. Such seeking of
advice cannot with propriety be called error; the act is the right of the court. . ..That
application was made for the privilege of so appearing is of no personal concern to the
parties, and the court may grant or refuse the request, according as it deems the proffered
information timely and useful or otherwise .... The question whether the trial judge should
or should not have received and considered this suggestion is not reviewable. . .."
29. See In re Utilities Power & Light Corp., 90 F. 2d 798 (C. C. A. 7th 1937); Detroit
Trust Co. v. Mason, 309 Mich. 281, 15 N. W. 2d 475 (1944).
30. E.g., Froehler v. North American Life Ins. Co., 374 lL 17, 27 N. E. 2d 833 (1940);
Spice Valley School Township v. Rizer, 1 N. E. 2d 289 (Ind. 1936); Grand Rapids v.
Consumers' Power Co., 216 Mich. 409, 185 N. W. 852 (1921); State ex retl. Zili.sch v. Auer,
197 Wis. 284, 223 N. IV. 123 (1929).

cation
to the
31.
32.
33.

The Court of Appeals of New York requires appli-

by motion with notice to the parties. For supreme court rules requiring application
court see note 34 infra.
442 (1859).
Matter of Guernsey, 21 111.
Spice Valley School Township v. Rizer, 1 N. E. 2d 289 (Ind. 1936).
Ore. Sup. CL Rule 14, 9 ORE. Comp. LAWS A,'N. § 331 (1940).

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 17

Few state supreme courts have written rules on the subject,3 ' but a
similar practice prevails throughout. While in contested applications
the United States Supreme Court requires the proposed brief of amicus
to be annexed to the application,3" other courts prohibit the filing of
the brief until permission has been granted. 0
On the other hand, the extremely liberal Rule 61 of the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania permits any person interested in the question
involved in an appeal-though not a party to it-to file a brief, serving
the same upon the parties to the appeal without either leave of the court
or the consent of the parties. The word "interested" as used in this
rule obviously means nothing more than the desire of a prospective
amicus to have his say on the question involved in the appeal.3 7
While the state courts generally follow the liberal practice of admitting amicus on application to the court, the Supreme Court of the
United States will in fact not grant permission under its Rule 2738 unless
the parties to the action have consented, or unless the application is
made by the United States or one of its officers or agencies and sponsored by the United States Attorney General, or by a state or political
subdivision thereof.
This rule embodied in the revision of the Supreme Court Rules in
1939 appears to preclude utilization of the channel towards more liberal practice created by the decision in Northern Securitief Co. v. United
States3" which laid down the test that the applicant need only show a
particular relationship to, or interest in, the case. While there is a
dearth of authorities defining the requisite interest of amicus, it would
4
seem to be primarily his economic or jurisprudential interest as party 0
or attorney for a client,4 or a claim or defense in common with the main
action, though it should not involve an extreme degree of partisanship
in the outcome of the litigation as affecting the decision in his own
34.

Colo. Sup. Ct. Rule 16, 211 Pac. VIII (1922) ; Idaho Sup. Ct. Rule 3, 62 Idaho XVII

(1941); Ore. Sup. Ct. Rule 14, .9 ORE. Comp. LAWS ANN.

§ 331 (1940); Pa. Sup. Ct.

Rule 61, construed in Commonwealth v. Quaker City Cab Co., 286 Pa. 224, 133 At. 228
(1926).

35. See letter of the Clerk of the United States Supreme Court to E. R. Beckwith,
June 1, 1945.
36.
37.

Froehler v. North American Ins. Co., 374 Ill. 17, 27 N. E. 2d 833 (1940).
Commonwealth v. Quaker City Cab Co., 286 Pa. 224, 133 Atl. 228 (1926).

The

court speaks of the indirect effect on petitioner "under the rule of stare decisis" as contrasted with direct effect required for intervention. Id. at 225, 133 Atl. at 228.
38.
39.

8 F. C. A. 214 (Cum. Supp. 1946).
191 U. S. 555 (1903).

40. See notes 33 and 37 supra.
41. "It does not appear that applicant [an attorney] is interested in any other case
which will be affected by the decision in this case. .

... "

191 U. S. 555, 556 (1903).
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case.' There is some indication that mere general interest in the
subject-matter of the case may not always be deemed sufficient even in
courts having a liberal practice 3
Attempts to formulate an objective test for admission of amicus
not based on his "interest," such as inadequate presentation of the law
by the parties,44 seem even less satisfactory in dealing with the problem
involved. While the Supreme Court in the Northern Securitics case rejected the advice of an attorney as amicus who was merely an innocent
bystander, it recognized and reserved its power to admit amicus in any
case when justified by the circumstances. It has not been possible to
discover any instances of such exercis of discretion.4 Those referred
to by the Supreme Court were all examples of truly exceptional circum46
stances in the long distant past.
Considering the variations in these rules, from the consent requirement of the United States Supreme Court to the most liberal state
practice, the Pennsylvania rule clearly would appear to be the most
satisfactory from a practical viewpoint.
On the other hand it seems desirable to call attention to the important
decision of the Federal District Court for the Western District of
Virginia, in Jewell Ridge Coal Corp. v. Local 6167,4r where the right "to
participate in the trial, present arguments and file briefs as an amicus
curia6&'a was conceded as a substitute for permissive intervention under
Federal Rule 24(b) .4 Although the applicant Southern Coal Producers
Association had neither a common defense or claim nor a statutory duty
42. See note 16 supra.
43. See note 41 supra. For the Court of Appeals of New York see Hobbs v. Dairymen's League, 282 N. Y. 710, 26 N. E. 2d 823 (1940) (American Mutual Alliance of
Chicago denied leave to act as amicus in workmen's compensation case for lack of sufficient
interest) ; People v. Bellows, 281 N. Y. 67, 22 IN. E. 2d 238 (1939).
44. Froehler v. North Americn Ins. Co., 374 Ill. 17, 27 N. E. 2d 833 (1940).
45. Letters of the Clerk of the United States Supreme Court to E. R. Beckith, June 7
and June 15, 1945. According to this correspondence immediately after the enactment of
Rule 27 (9) in 1939 practice in rejecting applications of non-official amid unaccompanied
by consent of the parties was very strict; and few, if any, instances of leniency would
appear to have occurred since then. But cf. p. 47 infra on requests of the Court for
briefs and argument by amicus.
46. The Gray Jacket, 5 Wall. 370 (U. S. 1867); Georgia v. Florida, 17 How. 478 (U. S.
1854); Greer v. Biddle, 8 Wheat. 1 (U. S. 1823).
47. 3 F. R. D. 251 (W. D. Va. 1943) (involving portal-to-portal pay in the coal mines).
48. Id. at 255. The district court relied in this decision on Northern Securities Co. v.
United States, 191 U. S. 555 (1903).
49. SA F. C. A. c. 15, Rule 24. The rule prescribes that "in exercising its discretion
the court shall consider whether the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties."
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with regard to the subject matter of the action to permit intervention
under Rule 24(b), its general economic interest in the question at issue
as the representative of its members jiistified its participation in the
trial as amicus even in the absence of that direct personal or pecuniary
interest supposed to be required of intervenors." Analogy to the right
to intervene of one charged with public duty under the United States
Realty case seemingly provides a sound basis of general policy for the
admission of amici, because it permits the court to distinguish between
those who are mere interlopers and those who can be expected to perform their important function so adequately that more extensive rights
may be allowed to them.
In so far as one may become amicus at the court's request, recent
state court cases seem to indicate only three major fields in which the
courts exercise this power:
(1) Where some matter involving the jurisdiction of local courts"2 or an important matter of practice in the state 53 is involved. Once appointed the
powers of amicus extend to any question
involved and are not'limited to
4
the one which he is asked to brief .
(2) In corporate reorganization proceedings coming before the state courtsparticularly involving real estate corporations-friends of the court have
been appointed to work out a plan of reorganization or adjustment almost
in the manner of a master or a referee.l
(3) In many localities, in domestic relations cases and in cases of juvenile delinquency, the courts have called upon members of the bar as individuals
or through Legal Aid Bureaus to render assistance in the representation
of parties or in the adjustment of personal difficulties. 0
50. SEC v. United States Realty & Improvement Co., 310 U. S. 434 (1940).
51. Cf., however, the general recognition of the practice in Rule 14 of the Oregon
Supreme Court, 9 Oregon Compiled Laws Annotated § 331 (1940), and similar rules In
Colorado and Idaho (Colo. Sup. Ct. Rule 16, 211 Pac. VIII (1922); Idaho Sup. Ct. Rule
3, 62 Idaho XVII (1941). A rare example of counset called upon in open court to
act as amicus (see In re Opinion of the Justices, 87 N. H. 492, 179 At. 357 (1935)) was
reported by the lawyer concerned as due solely to his accidental presence in court when
the case was reached. Letter of Louis E. Wyman, Esq., to E. R. Beckwith, April 27, 1945.
52. Whitney v. Randall, 70 Idaho 49, 70 P. 2d 384 (1937) (lower court vacating own
judgment for alleged want of jurisdiction without opposition of the parties).
53. In re Mumma's Estate, 2 Pa. Dist. R. 592 (Orphans' Ct. 1893) (Proper clerk's fees
in Lancaster County Orphans' Court). Morrow v. Morrow, 62 Nev. 492, 156 P. 2d 827
(1945) (propriety of striking answer of divorce defendant because filed by non-resident
attorney).
54. Morrow v. Morrow, supra note 53.
55. In re Utilities Power & Light Corp., 90 F. 2d 798 (C. C. A. 7th 1937) ; Detroit Trust
Co. v. Mason, 309 Mich. 281, 15 N. W. 2d 475 (1944).
56. That this practice is fairly widespread throughout the country is clear from an
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However, the Supreme Court of the United States has on rather rare
occasions requested legal advice from the other coordinate branches of
the Government where the pervading importance of the question involved5' or its technical aspects seemed to the Court to warrant itY8
D. Right to Compensation
As a general rule, amicus being a volunteer is not considered entitled
to compensation for his services,' 9 nor can he recover such costs as
may be allowed to a party to the action. 0
This is particularly true in the federal courts which can at all times
call on federal law officers, particularly the Department of Justice, to
assist them"' in unearthing fraud or in other functions performed frequently by amicus.
Actually, there are important exceptions to this broad rule. The first
arises where amicus was appointed by the court to perform some service for the court and is rather in the position of a master. In such cases
he is indeed clearly not a volunteer but an officer of the court which
appointed him to perform his work and which should allow him compensation. The leading case is the early Missouri decision of In re St.
Louis Institute12 where an attorney was appointed by the court to examine as amicus the corporate charter of the applicant institution and
was held entitled to compensation by analogy with commissioners appointed by the court under a statute authorizing their appointment to
hear depositions, and whom the courts were held to possess inherent
power to compensate. The principle of this decision was recently recognized in Detroit Trust Co. v. Mason,' and can now be considered established, particularly in the apparent absence of conflicting decisions. In
that case, involving a real estate reorganization proceeding in equity,
conflicting plans of reorganization were proposed and when a hearing
yielded no results an attorney was appointed to determine their feasibility, and to report thereon to the court. On subsequent objection to
inquiry made by E. R. Beckwith in 1946. Examples were found in California, Georgia,
Ilinois, Minnesota, New York, Pennsylvania and Wisconsin.
57. Myers v. United States, 272 U. S. 52 (1926) where the Court requested argument
and brief from Senator George IV. Pepper of Pennsylvania on the Senate's right to require
its consent to removal of executive employees. See PEPPER, PnmAD.txmA LAWvya 361
(1944).
58. Morris v. McComb, 16 U. S. L. WIrVn 4017 (U. S. Nov. 18, 1947).
59. Universal Oil Products Co. v. Root Refining Co., 328 U. S. 575, 581 (1946).
60. Colmes v. Fisher, 151 Misc. 222, 271 N. Y. Supp. 379 (Sup. Ct. 1934).
61. Universal Oil Products Co. v. Root Refining Co., 328 U. S. 575 (1946),
62. 27 Mo. App. 633 (1887).
63. 309 Mich. 281, 15 N. W. 2d 475 (1944).
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compensation of the amicus, the court not only reaffirmed its power
to appoint him, but also its inherent power to compensate those whose
labor it seeks.
The most important development, however, is the recent holding of
the Supreme Court in Universal Oil Products Co. v. Root Refining
Co. " ' that amicus may be compensated if the result of his labors falls
within the scope of Sprague v. Ticonic Nat. Bank, 4 primarily where
he creates a fund for recovery or establishes the right of claimants to
recover. However, the Root case on its facts did not involve a situation where this principle could be applied. On the contrary, the connection of amicus as attorney with the parties actually interested in reopening the particular decision for fraud, and the fact that amicus had
received compensation for his activities in the earlier stages of the case,
were held to be "not consonant with that regard of fastidiousness which
should govern a court of equity""5 in applying equitable principles of
compensation; granting compensation, the court found, would only have
resulted in repaying the clients of the amicus for the fees formerly paid
by them. Regardless of the actual outcome of the Root case, it now
appears clear that in the federal courts amicus may obtain compensation for services rendered, whether he acts at the request of the court
or on his own initiative if special circumstances can be shown, such as
that aid cannot be had from the Department of Justice or other law
officers or that the facts fall within the principles of the Sprague case.
Amicus
At the height of the Middle Ages amicus must have been a familiar
figure in the King's Bench, the highest court of law in England. Frequent references are found in the Rolls of Edward III, Henry IV and
later.", But amici in medieval and post-medieval England not only
spoke (as Lord Coke later said) "ut amici Curiae, and to inform the
Court of the truth"0 7 on the correct text of an ancient statute or the
intent of Parliament in enacting more recent ones, 8 or to advise on
II.

POWERS OF

63a. 328 U. S. 575 (1946).
64. 307 U. S. 161, 167 (1939).
65. 328 U. S. 575, 581 (1946).
66. Y. B. Mich. 5 Edw. IV 8 (1466); Y. B. Mich. 19 Hen. VI 10 (1448); Y. B. Hil. 4
Hen. VI 16 (1433); Y. B. 11 Hen. IV 62 (1410); Y. B. Hil. 26 Edw. III 65 (1353) and
numerous others.
67. The Prince's Case, 8 Co. 13b, 29a, 77 Eng. Rep. 496, 516 (1606).
68. Horton and Ruesby, Comb. 33, 90 Eng. Rep. 326 (1687), where "Sir G. Treby
(ut amicus Curiae) said he was present at the making of the said statute [the Statute
of Frauds], and that was the intention of the Parliament" (writ of execution binding
from date of issue, not from date of sale of goods seized).
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propositions of law in criminal cases, where English law then denied
the right to counsel."' Much more frequently and vigorously did amicus
guard the courts in the exercise of their jurisdiction against errors appearing on the face of the record7 pertaining to the accuracy and propriety of pleadings;-" he also suggested abatement of the proceeding
where the defendant had died; 2- he watched out for fundamental irregularities in proceedings such as faulty writs and inquisitions; 3 and perhaps most important of all, he called attention to invalid criminal indictments.' 4 Indeed, one of the earliest traditional roles of amicus occurred in the enforcement of the statute on the proper selection of
jurors,7' the disregard of which any stranger might urge upon the court
in order to quash the indictment.76
A. The Fundamental Conflict
Whether addressed to the substantive or procedural law, the basic
function of amicus as conceived by the English law at the threshold of
the modern era was finally summarized by counsel's argument in Protector v. Geerihg 7 arguing that "gross and apparent errors" should
always be brought to the court's attention even if the apparatus of party
action which is theoretically adequate has been stalled as it frequently
is. Thus this essay becomes an inquiry into the powers which amicus
ought to command as a means to assist in arriving at right judgment.
There are two quite separate battle grounds. One relates to procedure,
the other to substantive power. It will be necessary to examine them
piece-meal.
It might appear from what has been said above, and it is repeatedly
found in statements defining the status of amicus, that under modern
American practice in the majority of the courts any person may offer
to act as amicus in any cause and may take therein any position he
may choose on any point and may advocate any decision which he thinks
69. Tilburne's Case, 4 State Tr. 1270 (1649); Ratcliffe's Case, 18 State Tr. 429 (1746);
see Faulkner v. Rex [1905] 2 K. B. 76.
70. Smith v. Harman, 6 Mod. 142, 87 Eng. Rep. 901 (K. B. 1705).
71. Y. B. S Edw. IXr 124 (1466), Brev. des Plees, pl. 23.
72. Falmouth v. Strode, 11 Mod. 137, 88 Eng. Rep. 949 (K. B. 1708).
73. Protector v. Geering, Hardres 85, 145 Eng. Rep. 394 (1656); Y. B. 7 Ed&% IV
124 (1468).
74. Rex v. Vaux, Comb. 13, 90 Eng. Rep. 314 (1687).
75. STAT. 11 Hen. INV, c. 9 (1410).
76. 1 BoUVERs LAW Dicr. 188 (Rawle's 3d rev. 1914); cf. United States v. Gale, 109
U. S. 65 (1883). See note 8 supra.
77. Hardres 85, 145 Eng. Rep. 394 (1656).
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the court should render. 7 At least as to questions of law he would
appear to have a completely free hand."0
But in fact no such condition prevails, and at this point one enters
upon the first arena of contest between the parties to litigation and
the amicus admitted as adviser of the court, requiring in the end a
choice whether control of a lawsuit by the parties is more important
than any contribution which an outsider might make to a correct decision of the points involved.8" The former choice is generally made
by the courts, confining amicus strictly to the form and framework of
the case as selected by the parties. 8 ' The reason for this choice may
be the practical one that there should be an early end of litigation and
that almost any compromise is a good one; or it may be a product of
the deep suspicion of courts and judges which prevailed in the American Colonies, or it may be derived from the nineteenth century tradition of the freedom of enterprise as applied to the lawsuits and the
methods of lawyers.
This attitude finds its expression in the formula that amicus not being
a party cannot have the rights of a party to control or manage in any
way the action in which he participates.82 But rarely if ever have the
78. Amicus is "one who gives information to the court on some matter of law In
respect of which the court is doubtful." The Claveresk, 264 Fed. 276, 279 (C. C. A. 2d
1920). The scope of his advice is also defined as including "matters of judicial cognizance
or notice." United States v. Jabara & Bros., 19 Ct. C. P. App. 76 (1931). Perhaps the
most frequently quoted definition is found in In re Perry, 83 Ind. App. 456, 462, 148 N. E.
163, 165 (1925):
"... amicus curiae is one who, as a stander-by, when a judge is in doubt or mistaken
in a matter of law, may inform the court. He is heard only by leave, and for the
assistance of the court, upon a case then before it . . . [the practice is) to allow an
attorney, or other person, to appear as a friend of the court in a case, to act as an adviser of the court, and to make suggestions as to matters appearing upon the record, or
in matters of practice."
79. City of Winter Haven v. Gillespie, 84 F. 2d 285 (C. C. A. Sth 1936), cert. denied
sub norn. Hartridge-Cannon Co. v. Gillespie, 299 U. S. 606 (1936); Denver v. Denver
Tramway Corp., 23 F. 2d 287 (C. C. A. 8th 1927), cert. denied, 278 U. S. 616 (1928);
Klein v. Liss, 43 A. 2d 757 (Munic. Ct. App. D. C. 1945); Dodd v. Reese, 216 Ind. 449,
24 N. E. 2d 995 (1940). But cf. the limiting doctrine of State v. Albuquerque, 31 N. M.
576, 249 Pac. 242 (1926), and similar cases, discussed on p. 54 infra.
80. Cf. People v. Coleman, 53 Cal. App. 18, 127 P. 2d 309, 318 (1942), where in 4
capital criminal case new objections to the instructions to the jury brought forth by amicus
are considered "in the interest of justice."
81. See p. 52 infra.
82. Parker v. State ex rel. Powell, 133 Ind. 178, 32 N. E. 836 (1892) ; Taft v. Northern
Transp. Co., 56 N. H. 414 (1876); Kemp v. Rubin, 187 Misc. 707, 709, 64 N. Y. S. 2d 510,
512 (Sup. Ct. 1946); Dawe v. Silberman, 185 Misc. 335, 336, 56 N. Y. S. 2d 902, 903
(Munic. Ct. 1944).

19481

AMICUS CURIAE-MINISTER OF JUSTICE

courts stated the corollary to this proposition, that the powers and
privileges of amicus who is not a party to the action should logically
be developed in terms of his function as an adviser to the court. 3 In
some cases the courts have allowed amicus a broad scope. They will
be examined below 4 as possible precedents for the view advocated here
that his powers should be enlarged, so that he may be in a position
truly to "advise" in the general interest of justice.
B.

The Theory of Limited Powers

The view that the parties should control their litigation, rather than
that amicus should intervene to prevent indirect injustice to others or
in any way at. all to contribute to a correct decision, usually finds expression in the rule that amicus may not have party status in the litigation. This has several logical results. Amicus cannot be made a party
by service of papers upon him.85 Amicus who intervenes to suggest lack
of jurisdiction of the court on behalf of a party is properly deemed not
to have appeared for the party so as to have submitted him to the jurisdiction.86 Nor does the judgment in the case where amicus has presented his views on the law bind him if adverse, so that he is not prevented from relitigating the issue;8" and if amicus has appeared in
8
the trial court, he may again appear as such in the appellate tribunal
But amicus has been denied the right to demand service of papers, 81
a decision quite difficult to justify because one permitted to advise the
court should have every facility for knowing the facts and pleadings,
the more particularly if in a particular case amicus takes a position on
the law different from those advanced by both parties.
83. Cf. Jewell Ridge Coal Co. v. Local 6167, 3 F. R. D. 251 (W. D. Va. 1943).
84. See p. 54 infra.
85. Pueblo De Taos v. Archuleta, 64 F. 2d 807 (C. C. A. 10th 1933); Spinnler v.
Armstrong, 63 S. W. 2d 1071 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933).
86. Flinn v. Krotz, 293 S. W. 625 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927); Jones v. City of Jefferson, 66

Tex. 576, 1 S. W. 903 (1886). But.cf. Walker County Lumber Co. v. Edmonds, 298 S. W.
610 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927), holding that attorney for deceased defendant cannot appear as
amicus to urge dismissal of suit on behalf of defendant's widow so as to permit her not
to appear. On similar facts the same ruling was made in Olcott v. Reese, 291 S. W. 261
(Tea. Civ. App. 1927). Successful use of this local Texas practice by Texas attorney appearing as amicus in New York court is found in Karutz v. Karutz, No. 8615, Sup. Ct.
Queens County, N. Y., 1947 (amicus directing attention of official referee to overlooked
New York case showing lack of jurisdiction with regard to non-resident infant's custody).
87. Garland Co. v. Filmer, 1 F. Supp. 8 (N. D. Cal. 1932); Blanchard v. Boston & M.
R. R., 86 N. H. 263, 167 Ad. 158 (1933); Baird v. City of Williston, 58 N. D. 478, 226
N. W. 608 (1929).
88. See Sipes v. McGhee, 316 Mich. 614, 25 N. W. 2d 638 (1947), cert. granted, 331
U. S. 804 (1947).
89. Kemp v. Rubin, 187 Misc. 707, 64 N. Y. S. 2d 510 (Sup. Ct. 1946).
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It has been held that amicus not being a party may not file a pleading,9" make a procedural motion,9 ' offer evidence of his own, 2 examine
or cross-examine witnesses, 3 assign error, 4 appeal or apply for rehearing. 6 Some of these rules fall clearly enough within the principle
that amicus ought not to manage the suit; but some of them, such as
restrict the introduction of evidence or deny the right to assign error
on appeal, are of much more dubious justification. Even within the
limited field allowed him under these rules he is usually allowed to
address the court only by brief and not in oral argument.97 This goes
directly counter to the age-old habit of the legal profession to regard
the oral address as the highest form of presentation. Finally the courts
are almost unanimous in holding that amicus cannot raise any issue not
raised by the parties,"8 in spite of the converse principle that amicus
90. Baker v. Baker, 59 Nev. 163, 87 P. 2d 800 (1939).
91. In re Pina, 112 Cal. 14, 44 Pac. 332 (1896) (motion to reduce the record); Taft v.
Northern Transp. Co., 56 N. H. 414 (1876) (motion in opposition to discontinuance);
Matter of Bar Ass'n of Erie County, 182 Misc. 529, 47 N. Y. S. 2d 213 (County Ct. 1944)
(motion to expunge grand jury minutes); Ikard v. City of Henrietta, 33 S. W. 2d 578
(Tex. Civ. App. 1930) (motion to strike statement of fact filed by a party); Kempf v.
Kempf, 128 Wash. 228, 222 Pac. 485 (1924) (motion for final decree).
92. See Florida v. Georgia, 17 How. 478 (U. S. 1854); Dinet v. Orleans Dredging Co.,
149 So. 126 (La. App. 1933).
93. Moffat Tunnel Improvement Dist. v. Denver & S. L. Ry., 45 F. 2d 715, cert. denied,
283 U. S. 837 (C. C. A. 10th 1930); see Dawe v. Silberman, 185 Misc. 335, 336, 56 N. Y. S.
2d 902, 903 (Munic. Ct. 1944).
94. Phoenix v. Drinkwater, 46 Ariz. 470, 52 P. 2d 1175 (1935); cf. In re Kootz' Will,
228 Wis. 306, 280 N. W. 672 (1938).
95. Denver v. Denver Tramway Corp., 23 F. 2d 287 (C. C. A. 8th 1927), cert. denied,
278 U. S. 616 (1928); Douglas v. Trust Co. of Georgia, 147 Ga. 724, 95 S. E. 219 (1918).
96. New Orleans v. Liberty Shop, 157 La. 26, 101 So. 798 (1924).
97. Grand Rapids v. Consumers' Power Co., 216 Mich. 409, 185 N. W. 852 (1921);
Ore. Sup. Ct. Rule 14, 9 ORE. ComP. LAws ANN. § 331 (1940). Contra: The Employers'
Liability Cases, 207 U. S. 463 (1908); Jewell Ridge Coal Corp. v. Local 6167, 3 F. R. D.
251 (W. D. Va. 1943); Reed v. Blakley, 115 Colo. 559, 176 P. 2d 681 (1947), and numerous
other instances. Even where freely granted, participation of amicus in oral argument
is clearly discretionary with the court. Commonwealth v. Quaker City Cab Co., 286 Pa.
224, 138 AtI. 228 (1926). Private amici, differently from governmental representatives,
are rarely allowed to argue. See letter of the Clerk of the United States Supreme Court
to E. R. Beckwith, May 20, 1947. For one of the rare current examples see Sipes v.
McGhee, 316 Mich. 614, 25 N. W. 2d 638 (1947), cert. granted, 331 U. S. 804 (1947)
(Protestant Council of the City of New York permitted to argue orally. N. Y. Times,
Dec. 8, 1947, p. 31, col. 5).
98. Coming v. Patton, 236 Ala. 354, 182 So. 39 (1938); Eggert v. Pacific States Savings & Loan Co., 136 P. 2d 822 (Cal. App. 1943); Givens v. Gollstein, 52 A. 2d 725
(Munic. Ct. App. D. C. 1947); Samuel Herzig Corp. v. Gibbs, 295 Mass. 229, 3 N. E.
2d 831 (1936); Union Steam Pump Sales Co. v. Deland, 216 Mich. 261, 185 N. W. 353 (1921);
Matter of Roff, 226 Mo. App. 1203, 50 S. W. 2d 156 (1932); Davis v. McCasland, 182
Okla. 49, 75 P. 2d 1118 (1938).
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may raise any matter which the court may interject' cx mcro motu. 2
This negative principle is applied with special strictness to constitutional objections raised by amicus but n6t by the parties.'
Some courts
have even limited amicus at appellate level, regardless of the issues
and the record, to the matters set forth in the party's brief and the specific legal reasons urged therein. 1 '
The most extreme departure along this line is found in a Missouri
case 0 2 where the court held that a showing that election laws had been
violated could not be made by amicus where the party who would benefit had failed to suggest the point, and therefore even if true it need
not be denied by the other party.
The above rules are generally rationalized on the basis that amicus
is not a party to the litigation and must take the case as he finds it.'"
But at least one court has managed to formulate a more sophisticated
approach to the problem, basing the result on procedural grounds of
waiver. Defendants there initially made the point of law that due to
the effect of a constitutional amendment allegedly causing the implied
repeal of an earlier statute public bathing rights in Lake Ponthartrain
had been lost, making all bathers on its shores trespassers. Later defendants waived this point but amicus continued to stress it in the
brief. The court held that it need not pass on the question of statutory
construction, because defendants had waived it and therefore amicusconceived as standing in the shoes of the party whose contentions he
happens to support-was likewise foreclosed from making the point
even though it might have been decisive of the question' 0 4
99. For the scope of this rule see p. 55 infra. It would seem, however, that since a
court can always draw the attention of the parties to aspects of law overlooked by them,
the two rules conflict head-on and that amicus should be entitled to raise points of law

freely.
100.

Higbee v. Housing Authority of Jacksonville, 143 Fla. 560, 197 So. 479 (1940);

Laret Investment Co. v. Dickmann, 345 Mo. 449, 134 S. W. 2d 65 (1939); State v.
Albuquerque, 31 N. M. 576, 249 Pac. 242 (1926); Davis v. McCasland, 182 Okla. 49,
75 P. 2d 1118 (1938); In re Kootz' Will, 228 Wis. 306, 280 N. IV. 672 (1938).

101. Cook v. Harry Dobson Sheet Metal Works, 157 Kan. 576, 142 P. 2d 709, 710
(1943): "Without more, we hold that amid curiae may not urge in this court as a ground
for reversal, a matter not presented in the brief of the appellant." Accord, Indiana State
Board v. Suelean, 219 Ind. 321, 37 N. E. 2d 935 (1941)

(as to grounds of unconstitution-

ality of a statute); State v. Martin, 210 Iowa 376, 228 N. W. 1 (1929) (same).
102. State ex rel. Bates v. Remmers, 325 Mo. 1175, 30 S.W. 2d 609 (1930).
103. Union Steam Pump Sales Co. v. Deland, 216 Mich. 261, 185 N. W. 353 (1921);
State ex rel. News Corp. v. Smith, 353 Mo. 845, 184 S.W. 2d 598 (1945); Kemp v. Rubin,
187 Misc. 707, 64 N. Y. S. 2d 510 (Sup. CL 1946).
104. Dinet v. Orleans Dredging Co., 149 So. 126 (La. App. 1933); Laret Investment
Co. v. Dickmann, 345 Mo. 449, 134 S. W. 2d 65 (1939). Constitutional objection of amicus
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Where amicus attempts to question the constitutionality of a statute
not contested by the parties, additional reasons have been advanced
to foreclose him. Thus in the absence of an assignment of error a court
has refused to consider constitutional questions raised by amicus upon
((mere suggestions" in his brief," 5 or has blandly denied amicus a constitutional locus standi of his own because he is not a party adversely
affected by the statute'0 or lacks sufficient personal interest to raise it.",'
In this troubled context it is not greatly surprising that the formula
limiting the powers of amicus is generally accepted, and that exceptions tending toward a more effective scope of activity have not been
more commonly followed. These restrictive decisions seem to be susceptible to the generalization that the economy of the process and
the autonomy of the parties make it preferable to limit control of the
action rather than to allow greater latitude to an intervenor who may
contribute to correct decision but may also delay or complicate the
progress of the litigation.
This amounts to saying that here, as in so many other phases of
judicial operation, there is a tug-of-war between the immediate efficiency
of the process and the wider public interest. Efficiency may seem to
require that the parties should be few and the issues limited, or that
the machinery of judicial administration should not be manipulated by
one who will not be bound by the result; but conversely the ends of
right judgment should not be defeated by the neglect of obvious errors,
by the self-interest of the parties, the incompetence of their attorneys
or the judge, nor by collusion, or fraud perpetrated anywhere along the
line.
The foregoing serves to illustrate the views of those courts which are
not hospitable to the advice of amicus and which, whether consciously
for that reason or in strict pursuance of the logical syllogism relating
to the parties' rights, have tended to restrict the manner and extent
of the assistance they will entertain. There are, however, other jurisdictions which view the subject differently.
C. Existing Avenues towards Broader Power
As stated in the preceding section, the rule limiting amicus to the
issues, and in some jurisdictions even to the arguments, raiged by the
in appellate court held inadmissable, since party had waived it by failure to make timely
objection in trial court.
105. In. re Kootz' Will, 228 Wis. 306, 280 N. W. 672 (1938), as if substantiality of
form of objection were of the essence.
106. Higbee v. Housing Authority of Jacksonville, 143 Fla. 560, 197 So. 479 (1940);
State v. Albuquerque, 31 N. M. 576, 249 Pac. 242 (1926).
107. Davis v. McCasland, 182 Okla. 49, 75 P. 2d 1118 (1938).
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parties meets with another rule that amicus may address to the court
suggestions on any point on which the court may act on its own
motion.,0
Postponing for the moment an examination of the scope of this affirmative rule, it should be noted that at least one court, though paying
lip-service to the rule restricting the range of amicus' action, has none
the less found an overriding public interest in the case at bar to justify
consideration of additional points raised by amicus.' 0 9 The public interest so found, in one case involving the disbursement of public funds
and in another the life and liberty of a man accused of rape, might well
have been found earlier in the election case of State ex rel. Bates v.
Retrners"° by the same Missouri court, and certainly so then because
one of the parties had a locus standi to raise constitutional questions as
a matter of general law."'
Regardless of any question of public interest which may induce a
court to hear arguments of "amicus to which its ears would otherwise
be closed, the courts have in fact often permitted amicus to raise any
question which the court" may raise on its own motion. It does not
appear that the generic subject of what a court may do or. inquire into
in this manner has been given systematic treatment, and none is attempted here. The rule is generally stated to apply to defects in the
to
proceedings of which the court must take notice at any stage and 113
involve such matters as lack of statutory jurisdiction in the lower court,
inadvertent entry of judgment," 4 or that the case is moot" or collusive" or that facts on which jurisdiction must be based are
10. Moring v. Lisenby, 241 Ala. 626, 4 So. 2d 4 (1941); Stewart v. Herten, 125 Neb.
210, 249 N. W. 552 (1933); State v. Jefferson Iron Co., 60 Tex. 312 (1883).
109. People v. Coleman, 53 Cal. App. 18, 127 P. 2d 309 (1942); State cx rt. News
Corp. v. Smith, 353 Mo. 845, 184 S. W. 2d 598 (1945).
110. See note 102 supra.
111. As to this problem see Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U. S. 288 (1936).
1945) (amicus cannot
112. But cf. United States v. Brokaw, 60 F. Supp. 100 (S. . Ill.
move to vacate volle prosequi because prosecution of cases is under control of the United
States Attorney and not of the court).
113. Stewart v. Herten, 125 Neb. 210, 249 N. IV. 552 (1933).
114. Revell v. Dishong, 129 Fla. 9, 175 So. 905 (1937) (mandamus proceedings).
115. Morrow v. Morrow, 62 Nev. 492, 156 P. 2d 827, 829 (1945). If the fact that
the case is moot comes to the attention of the court "it is as much the duty of the court
to dismiss it in this case as in the other." See also Lemp v. Lemp, 62 Nev. 91, 141 P.

2d 212 (1943).
116. Haley v. Eureka County Bank, 21 Nev. 127, 26 Pac. 64 (1891); Judson v. Flushing Jockey Club, 14 Misc. 350, 36 N. Y. Supp. 126 (C. P. 1895); Muskogee G. & E. Co.
v. Haskell, 38 Okla. 358, 132 Pac. 1098 (1913); Vard v. Alsup, 100 Tenn. 619, 46 S. W.
573 (1898). In that regard the courts even speak of a duty of members of the bar to
bring the facts before them as amic. Ward v. Alsup, supra at 574.
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absent. 1 7 Amicus may also suggest the quashing of an unauthorized
attachment, the setting aside of a summons served on an improper
person because the court had not acquired jurisdiction over the party," 8
and he may act where the court has lost jurisdiction once acquired as
by abatement of the action." 9 Other matters have also been held within
the plenary powers of the courts, e.g., the status of personal representatives. 2 ' In all these cases amicus may act by motion 12 ' and in a proper
case a reference will be ordered to ascertain the facts. 22
It has been held that amicus may submit evidence in affidavit form
to present the necessary facts to support his suggesfion or motion." 'a
Even when amicus has made a simple -suggestion as adviser to the court
on a matter where action ex mero motu is not involved in the technical
sense and notwithstanding any contrary rule, some courts have allowed
him to submit evidence of his own,'2 4 either documentary 12 r or by
12
affidavit 20 or by examination of witnesses introduced by the parties; 1
and it would be equally logical that in proper cases amicus should be
granted the right to introduce his own witnesses. Generally speaking,
the existence of a sufficient public interest such as protection of the
general public against rent-gouging would seem to justify departure
from the commonly accepted rule.
117. Moring v. Lisenby, 241 Ala. 626, 4 So. 2d 4 (1941).
118. Boyd v. Lemmerman, 11 N. J. Misc. 701, 168 Atl. 47 (1933) (improper service
on non-resident motorist); Spinnler v. Armstrong, 63 S. W. 2d 1071 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933).
119. Boyd v. Lemmerman, supra note 118; Falmouth v. Strode, 11 Mod. 137, 88 Eng.
Rep. 949 (K. B. 1708); cf. King v. Bruckenridge, 2 Show. K. B. 297, 89 Eng. Rep. 950
(1685).
120. Moring v. Lisenby, 241 Ala. 626, 4 So. 2d 4 (1941) (removal of personal representative). See also In re Perry, 83 Ind. App. 456, 148 N. E. 163 (1925). Contra: Sullivan
v. Dunne, 198 Cal. 183, 244 Pac. 343 (1926) (appointment of personal representative).
121. Helmbright v. John A. Gebelein, Inc., 19 F. Supp. 621 (D. C. Md. 1937) (motion
by United States Attorney as amicus to dismiss); Moring v. Lisenby, 241 Ala. 626, 4
So. 2d 4 (1941); Waits v. Black Bayou Drainage Dist., 185 So. 577 (Miss. 1939) (on
appeal by attorney general as amicus); Morrow v. Morrow, 62 Nev. 492, 156 P. 2d
827 (1945).
122. Judson v. Flushing Jockey Club, 14 Misc. 350, 36 N. Y. Supp. 126 (C. P. 1895).
123. Revell v. Dishong, 129 Fla. 9, 175 So. 905 (1937). If the matter goes to reference, presumably evidence could be presented in other forms too. Cf. Judson v. Flushing
Jockey Club, supra note 122.
124. Parker v. State ex rel. Powell, 133 Ind. 178, 32 N. E. 836 (1892); Morrow v.
Morrow, 62 Nev. 492, 156 P. 2d 827 (1945); Bass v. Fountleroy, 11 Tex. 698 (1854); see
note 123 supra, and notes 125-27 infra.
125. See Florida v. Georgia, 17 How. 478 (U. S. 1854) (maps in boundary dispute).
126. Robinson v. Lee, 122 Fed. 1010 (C. C. S. C. 1903).
127. Dawe v. Silberman, 185 Misc. 335, 56 N. Y. S. 2d 902 (Munic. Ct. 1944); Ladue
v. Goodhead, 181 Misc. 807, 44 N. Y. S. 2d 783 (County Ct. 1943).
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Finally, the courts have recognized the power of amicus to advise
on matters of judicial notice' and the technique of the so-called "Brandeis brief" would therefore seem available to bring before a court the
political, economic and social data which would permit it to rest its
decision on a sound factual formulation. It would be reasonable to suppose that a court would be willing to receive such a brief based on
facts of which it might take judicial notice or adducing material necessary or useful to a decision of broad constitutional issues or of questions of statutory construction. The parties are sometimes not able to
present such data. But the courts have tended to avoid this problem
by finding that the facts when presented by amicus are outside the
scope of judicial notice. 9
In a recent decision the court sidestepped the issue by ostensibly limiting itself to the facts appearing in the record. It said:
"The several amicus curiae briefs indulge in considerable amplification and
elaboration upon appellants' arguments on public policy and the constitutional
questions involved in this appeal. In addition, these briefs contain valuable
material with respect to the related social and economic problems. We are impressed with the fact that the Negro population of Detroit has increased from
40,438 in 1930 to approximately 210,000 in 1944 and that it then was approximately 12 per cent of the population of the city.
"The arguments based on the factual statement pertaining to questions of
public health, safety and delinquency are strong and convincing. However,
we must confine our decision to the matters within the record submitted to us
and the questions raised in the briefs of the parties to the cause. 'lo' :
It thus appears that the technical instruments in the form of precedents and procedural rationalization are at hand to give amicus any
amount of influence that a court really wishes him to have, and that a
restatement of the rules in terms of powers commensurate with his
proper position is possible. The remainder of this essay will be devoted
first to a search for the principles justifying such enlarged powers, and
secondly to a brief restatement of what these powers should be in the
various types of situations to which they may be applied.
128. United States v. Jabara & Bros., 19 CL C. P. App. 76 (1931), cert. denied, 284
U. S. 623 (1931).
129. State ex rel. Froedtert Grain & Malting Co. v. Tax Commission, 221 Wis. 225, 265
N. W. 672 (1936) (amicus brief with statistical data on incidence of dividend income
tax).
130. Sipes v. McGhee, 316 Mich. 614, 627, 25 N. W. 2d 638, 644 (1947), cert. granted,
331 U. S. 804 (1947).
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THE ARGUMENT FOR ENLARGED POWERS

If it were correctly said that the outcome of litigation is only a matter
of private convenience or interest, affecting none other than the parties,
then obviously no general philosophical or metaphysical principles are
relevant. The parties may select the issues, present such facts as they
deem advantageous and may even keep back those which they deem
deleterious to their respective causes. They are then free to present
such points of law as suit their claims, to make such arguments, however specious, as may weaken their opponent's case; and it is nobody's
business whether the decision arrived at creates harm to other actual
or prospective litigants, overthrows a settled course of action theretofore relied on, or leads to inequitable rules of law, because this lawsuit is to be carried on as a duel in which the public may be hurt but
may not defend or protect itself.
Contrariwise, however, it has been recognized since earliest times
that under the common law system wherein precedents exercise a potent
influence upon the creation of law, it is a matter of grave public interest
that each rivulet of judgment flowing into the general stream of juridical
history shall be as pure and precisely right as it can be made by skilful
and disinterested effort. Judge-made law should therefore be rationally
made in honest lawsuits and not in collusive actions, and the courts'
integrity should be preserved by preventing any imposition upon it,1l 1
by having the attention of the judge drawn to obvious errors 1 2 and by
presenting any weighty aspect of fact and law which one or both of the
parties out of ineptitude or self-interest may have failed to argue. 133
131. United States v. Johnson, 319 U. S. 302 (1943). Even though the Government
was notified to defend constitutionality of rent control under the Emergency Price' Control Act of 1942 (56 STAT. 23 (1942), as amended, 60 STAT. 664, 50 U. S. C. App. § 901
(Supp. 1946)) pursuant to title 28, § 401 of the United States Code (see note 23 supra),
the Government obtained dismissal of the suit "as collusive because .. .not in any real
sense adversary .. . [i.e., lacking the] 'honest and antagonistic assertion of rights' to be
adjudicated-a safeguard essential to the integrity of the judicial process, anl one . . .
held to be indispensable to the adjudication of constitutional questions . . ." by the courts.
Id. at 305.

132. See Protector v. Geering, Hardres 85, 86, 145 Eng. Rep. 394 (1656); Falmouth v.
Strode, 11 Mod. 137, 88 Eng. Rep. 949 (K. B. 1708). For a different solution of the
same problem under the entirely different canon law system of the Roman Catholic Church
compare the function of the Advocatus Diaboli in certain proceedings, thus described In
I Catholic Encyclopedia 168 (1907): "His duty is to protest against the omission of the
forms laid down, and to insist upon the consideration of any objection."
133.

The Claveresk, 264 Fed. 276, 279 (C.. C. A. 2d 1920): ".

.

. it is for the public

interest that the men who happen to he judges shall be well informed in matters of public
concern, and the law is always such a matter. That . . .is of no personal concern to
the parties. .. Y
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The real controversy arises between the economy of judicial administration and the ideal of right judgment.
That the courts have recognized this underlying motivation, even
when pronouncing rules designed to limit the powers of amicus, is
apparent."3 ' That amicus is not a party to the action and that his powers
and disabilities should not be judged by the rights accorded to a party,
can be considered as axiomatic. But as a correlative those powers should
be commensurate with the advisory functions which he is called upon
to perform, and should enable him properly to render in the administration of justice the services implied in his position. The fact is that
a court may raise issues of its own, it may emphasize issues not considered by the parties on the facts presented, or it may support its
decision by reasons which the parties failed to bring forth. One whom
the court has authorized to give his advice and to aid in the finding
of a correct solution of a case should have no less scope in advising the
court than the entire field which the decision may encompass.
The elements involved in this broad problem seem not to have been
previously reduced to practicable form. The following considerations
are here suggested as indicating the criteria which should be operative
in formulating rules to govern the rights, powers, duties and privileges
of amicus:
(1) Whether amicus should have different powers in respect of
(a) procedure, as regards the conduct of the case, and
(b) substance, as a matter of ultimate justice;
(2) Whether amicus should have powers of different scope in respect
of his reason for participation in the case
(a) disinterestedly pro bono publico, or
(b) privately as or for one having a similar interest.13
Without much difficulty a rule can be devised defining a broad
power of amicus to intervene in all matters of substance raised by any
possible view of the law of the case and to adduce all the facts of
which the court should take notice. In regard to other questions of
134. See note 133 supra. The need for reconciliation of this conflict may justify the
action of some courts in rejecting from consideration points raised by amid, who refuse
to become parties by intervention or refuse as amid to put their cards on the table at
the trial. Golden Gate Bridge & Highway Dist v. Felt, 214 Cal. 308, 5 P. 2d 585 (1931).
This may be a more"doubtful solution where the Government itself is concerned. Compare
R. C. Tway Coal Co. v. Glenn, 12 F. Supp. 570 (W. . Ky. 1935), with United States v.
Johnson, 319 U. S. 302 (1943).
135. United States v. Northern Securities Co., 191 U. S. 555 (1903). See also Jewel
Ridge Coal Co. v. Local 6167, 3 F. R. D. 251 (W. D. Va. 1943).
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evidence the present practice if liberally interpreted will also furnish
a satisfactory basis for a reformulation of the rule. On the other hand
further investigation seems necessary before suitable rules could be
established to govern amicus' right to do such things as (1) to attempt
to correct or supplement the pleadings; (2) to participate in opening and
closing the case and in incidental arguments; (3) to move to dismiss
or for new trial or for rehearing on other than jurisdictional grounds;
(4) to appeal and determine the contents of the record on appeal as
an independent or collateral right.
Finally whether left to the court's discretion in each case or formulated as a fixed rule of court it may be possible to lay down a norm
to govern situations when amicus should be admitted in the public or
private interest and just what rights he should exercise in each case.
New forms of participation in proceedings developed in reorganizations
under Section 206 of the Bankruptcy Act 1 36 or before the Securities and

Exchange Commission 137 and pursuant to Federal Rule 24(b) on permissive intervention 138 may provide some guideposts.
A representative committee of the bar undertaking to intervene in a
matter of public law is probably amicus par excellence. 3 9 It cannot be
136. 52 STAT. 894 (1938), 11 U. S. C. § 606 (1940). This section gives to any creditor
.or stockholder of the debtor the right to be heard on all matters arising in a Chapter X
proceeding, even though not a party. In re 211 East Delaware Place Bldg. Corp., 15 F.
Supp. 947 (N. D. Ill. 1936). Nor may the court exercise any discretion under § 206.
In re Philadelphia & Reading Coal & Iron Co., 105 F. 2d 358 (C. C. A. 3d 1939).
137. SEC Rules of Practice, 17 CODE FED. REGS. § 201.17 (Cum. Supp. 1944), providing
for leave to be heard which "may include leave to call and examine witnesses, to offer documentary evidence, to cross-examine witnesses, to file briefs, to submit proposed findings and
conclusions and to make oral argument." Rule XVII (c). One to whom such leave is granted
is nevertheless not a party. Rule XVII (c) and (d).
138. P. 45 supra.
139. The bar associations, as presently constituted, whether voluntary or integrated
organizations, show relatively little interest of this kind. Much of their activity is confined to acting as a party proponent in disciplinary or unlawful practice cases. For an
occasional activity as amicus in the related field of admission to the bar see In re Todd,
208 Ind. 168, 193 N. E. 865 (1935), where the Indiana Supreme Court upheld the passing of bar examinations as a condition for admission to practice. See also Kuhn v. Curran,
294 N. Y. 207, 61 N. E. 2d 513 (1945) (constitutionality of statute creating tenth judicial
district, Lawyers Association of Suffolk County as amicus against Suffolk County Bar
Ass'n as amicus in support of statute); Cowen v. Reavy, 283 N. Y. 232, 28 N. E. 2d 390
(1940) (New York County Lawyers Association, New York State Bar Association and
National Lawyers Guild as amici in case involving qualifications for lawyers in civil service examination). However, in recent years both the American and New York State Bar
Associations and the Association of the Bar of the City of New York have had civil rights
committees which acted as amici in civil liberties cases affecting the rights of members
of the sect of Jehovah's Witnesses. Gobitis v. Minersville School Dist., 310 U. S. 586
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doubted that such an adviser to the court should be able to rely on the
broadest powers in every point of substance and be invested with the
right to do so. With this in mind, as the norm of the true amicus whose
duty and high privilege it is to advise and assist in giving right judgment, it would seem possible to find the necessary gradations in cases
of private concern.
IV. DESIRABLE RULEs
Public interest, economic interest in the question at issue or in a like
case, inadequacy of presentation,' 10 these provide illuminating formulas
for a standard to guide the court's discretion in granting or denying
leave to amicus in any case. But the rule requiring consent of the parties needs to be qualified. It is doubtless well enough to require consent
in any merely private litigation, or perhaps in any case on appeal where
the law is well settled and the evidence in the record supports the decision below. But surely in any case which patently affects the public
interest a party should not have the power to exclude amicus who can
show that he is qualified to intervene in behalf of that interest.
It is clearly desirable to affirm the principle that the parties should
"control their litigation" and that no outsider should be heard to say
that he would conduct it in some other way-unless it is made to appear
that the actual state of the case will lead to miscarriage of justice which
will be prejudicial to persons other than the parties.
From this it follows that on mere procedural matters not affecting
either the scope of the action or the jurisdiction of the court or the
reasoning of a decision on general principle, amicus should have no
voice at all. But when procedure has reached its end and the ideals of
impersonal justice may be at stake, there is a broad basis for saying that
the disinterested non-party may effectively intervene in behalf of those
ideals.
It also follows that, within the limits suggested, amicus should be allowed to introduce evidence, to cross-examine, to raise all possible
issues and on any grounds or reasons, to argue orally and, when an
appeal or other step for review is taken by any party, to assign his own
(1940); People v. Strong, 294 N. Y. 930, 63 N. E. 2d 119 (1945); People v. Barber, 289
N. Y. 378, 46 N. E. 2d 329 (1943). The National Lawyers Guild has also frequently
acted as amicus in civil liberties cases. In re Chirillo, 283 N. Y. 417, 28 N. E. 2d 895 (1940).
For other examples of bar associations acting as amid see I n re Constitutional Convention,
55 R. I. 56, 178 A. 433 (1935) (submitting arguments pro and con as to right of general assembly to call such convention); Flournoy v. Wiener, 321 U. S. 253 (1944) (Louisiana and Washington State Bar Associations as amici in defense of tax privileges of community property states).
140. See notes 40-44 supra.
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errors. It does not follow that in any ordinary case he should be permitted to appeal when no party desires to do so.
So much applies to any amicus whom the court may consent to hear.
The question remains whether there ought not to be a different measure
of competence between one amicus and another. Assuming, as it is here
proposed, that such distinctions exist, there should be a rule requiring
every amicus to set forth (perhaps in his verified petition for leave to
intervene) the facts defining just what his interest is. Typically, he may
be (a) an outsider having an economic or other personal interest in
arguing for a particular decision; or (b) one who because of a broader
political, economic, social, intellectual or professional viewpoint desires
to bring his influence or prestige to the support of one or the other party;
or (c) a still more truly disinterested advocate of the public interest.
It is believed that if amicus were required to classify himself according to such standards, the court would know at the outset the motivation
and the special expertness of the intervenor, and in the exercise of its
discretion it could limit him to his brief or, on points of difficulty within
his recognized competence, it could call for his special assistance in
additional oral argument or in the actual conduct of the trial or appeal.
To assist in giving right judgment is a high privilege and it is no less
a necessary duty, both for those who can assist to do so' 4 ' and for the
courts to accept such assistance where needfully and properly tendered.
The present rules, as they are indicated in most of the decisions here
reviewed, are too narrow and restrictive where skill is offered even
through self-interest and far too much so where the assistance can be
shown to be both competent and disinterested. Revisions along the two
lines, first requiring adequate disclosure and then relaxing limitations
in every proper case, should bring a new and helpful power to the
courts. The immediate result should be a greater utility of the assistance now occasionally offered. In the long run the recognition of its
value should cause a more active part in the giving of judgmentto be
taken by those persons and agencies best qualified to serve the public
interest.
141.

Haley v. Eureka County Bank, 21 Nev. 127, 26 Pac. 64 (1891).

